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NOTES
Circumventing Due Process: A Judicial
Response to Criminal Recidivism Under
the Bail Reform Act
Today a majority of the Court applies itself to an ominous
exercise in demolition. Theirs is truly a decision which will go
forth without authority and come back without respect.'
Introduction
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act")2 authorizes pretrial im-
prisonment of defendants charged with certain serious crimes3 if a federal
judge determines that no bail or release conditions can assure "the safety
... of the community."' 4 Thus, judges now can detain, until the conclu-
sion of trial,5 unconvicted criminal defendants who are considered likely
to commit or continue criminal activities.'
Prior to 1984, judges could detain only those defendants considered
likely to flee before trial or those defendants who threatened to harm, or
did harm, witnesses, jurors, or other participants in the judicial process.7
This shift in pretrial detention policy reflects "the deep public concern
. ..about the growing problem of crimes committed by persons on
release."'
1. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2112 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
majority in Salerno upheld as constitutional statutory authorization of pretrial detention on
the basis of dangerousness.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142-3156 (1985).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1985).
5. Detention may extend beyond trial pending sentencing or appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3143
(1985).
6. "[Future criminality... [i]s an assumption implicit in permitting pretrial detention
based on perceived defendant dangerousness .... S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
7. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1982), repealed by Bail Reform Act of
1984, ch. 1, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (1985).
8. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 6. See also Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A
Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1985): "The social
and historical shift in the recent decades, away from poverty and civil liberty concerns and
toward a climate marked more by heightened public fear of crime and 'law and order' politics
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Civil libertarians and advocates of stricter law enforcement have
long debated the constitutionality of preventive detention.9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Sa-
lerno,1° recently struck down the Act's preventive detention provision as
a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court reversed
this decision, holding the Act constitutional on its face.11 The Supreme
Court concluded that pretrial detention under the Act "is regulatory in
nature, and does not constitute punishment." 2 As such, the govern-
ment's interest in community safety can, and in this case does, outweigh
an individual's liberty interest.13 Further, the Act contains sufficient pro-
cedural safeguards to guarantee defendants their due process rights. 4
Although a statute provides the constitutionally mandated proce-
dural safeguards, it nonetheless may be constitutionally defective if
courts interpret and apply its provisions in ways which exceed the socie-
tal interests it is designed to protect. x5 Congress did not, and probably
could not, in accordance with the United States Constitution, authorize
the pretrial detention of all criminal defendants. Congress drafted the
Act to apply to a narrow group of dangerous defendants who are likely
to engage in criminal activity pending trial.16
A survey of the case law indicates a flood of litigation regarding the
proper interpretation and application of the Act's provisions, 17 questions
which the Supreme Court has declined to address." The problem ap-
pears to be twofold. First, the language of the Act is ambiguous, requir-
ing courts to look to the legislative history. Second, the legislative
may explain the evolution of the danger-oriented agenda of bail and pretrial detention
practices."
9. Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Issue of Preventive Detention, N.Y. Times, Jan.
22, 1987, at B17, col. 1.
10. 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). The Fifth Amendment
provides, in part: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103-04 (1987).
12. Id. at 2101-03.
13. Id. at 2102.
14. Id. at 2104.
15. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 8.
16. Id. at 6-7.
17. United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1986) (challenge to detention based on
unenumerated offense); United States v. Cardenas, 784 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1986) (challenge to
government's use of proffer to defeat rights of confrontation and cross-examination); United
States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986) (challenge to use of in camera evidence and
potential length of detention); United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985) (chal-
lenge to use of indictment as substitute for judicial finding of probable cause); United States v.
Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985) (challenge to effect of presumption's burden); United
States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203 (lst Cir 1985) (challenge to government's use of
hearsay).
18. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 n.3 (1987).
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history indicates that Congress, in determining which procedures were
constitutionally required to detain a person pending trial, may have re-
lied on the wrong Supreme Court decision.19 That decision, Gerstein v.
Pugh,20 held that persons in the post-arrest setting are not entitled to the
adversary safeguards provided to defendants in a trial, but are only enti-
tled to a probable cause hearing.21 Lower courts, in search of guidelines
to interpret and apply the Act, rely on the constitutional standards set
out in Gerstein to deny defendants the full rights and procedural safe-
guards provided for in the Act.22
This Note examines the provisions and the legislative history of the
Act and suggests alternative interpretations of Supreme Court decisions
and how they affect interpretation and application of the Act. Part I
describes the Act's provisions for pretrial detention based on dangerous-
ness of the suspect. Part II examines the legislative history of the Act,
including the cases upon which Congress relied, and outlines an alterna-
tive framework for determining due process standards. Part III analyzes
several of the Act's procedural safeguards as interpreted and applied by
the courts and suggests alternatives which are better able to insure due
process. This Note concludes that due process and the preservation of
judicial integrity require federal judges to interpret and apply the provi-
sions of the Act in a way which guarantees defendants their constitu-
tional rights and the full benefit of the Act's procedural safeguards.
1. The Preventive Detention Provisions of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984
The government may request a detention hearing based on an ac-
cused's dangerousness when a person is charged with one of the follow-
ing offenses: a crime of violence,23 an offense punishable by life
imprisonment or death, a drug offense punishable by ten or more years in
prison, or a felony which follows two prior convictions for any of the
above offenses.24 Only those defendants charged with an offense named
in the Act may be detained on the basis of dangerousness, 25 although a
19. See infra Section II.
20. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
21. Id. at 120.
22. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
23. The phrase "crime of violence" means
(A) an offense that has as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another; or
(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substan-
tial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (1985).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (1985).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985) (government must
charge defendant with crime of violence).
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defendant may be subject to detention as a flight risk or to prevent ob-
struction of justice.26 The court also must determine at the hearing
whether there is probable cause to believe the person committed the
charged offense.27
The hearing must be held immediately upon the person's first ap-
pearance before the judicial officer unless the accused or the government
seeks a limited continuance. At the hearing, the person has the right to
counsel, to testify, to cross-examine witnessess who appear at the hear-
ing, and to present evidence by proffer28 or otherwise. Trial rules limit-
ing admissibility of evidence do not apply.29
After finding the requisite probable cause, the court may consider
evidence indicating whether the person is likely to engage in criminal
activity prior to trial. The court must consider the offense charged, the
weight of the evidence, the history of the person, and the seriousness of
the danger to the community. To imprison the person pending trial, the
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or
combination of conditions for release will reasonably assure the safety of
the community.30
In addition to the above factors, there are two situations in which a
rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or combination of condi-
tions for release will reasonably assure the community's safety. The first
rebuttable presumption arises when an accused has recently been con-
victed of a serious crime which was committed while the accused awaited
trial for an earlier crime.31 Once the government demonstrates these pre-
requisites, the burden shifts to the accused "to establish a basis for con-
cluding that there are conditions of release sufficient to assure that he will
not again engage in dangerous criminal activity pending his trial."32
This presumption rarely arises, however, due to the infrequency with
which all three conditions occur.
The second and more common rebuttable presumption arises
against an accused charged either with a drug offense punishable by a
maximum of ten years or more in prison or with carrying a firearm dur-
ing the commission of a felony.3 3 As with the first presumption, the
court must first find probable cause to believe the person committed the
charged offense.34 Both the Act and the legislative history are silent on
26. 18 U.S.C. 3142 (f)(2) (1985).
27. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 18 n.57 (citing FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 4(a), 5(a)).
28. "To offer or tender, as, the production of a document and offer of the same in evi-
dence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 632 (5th ed. 1983).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (1985).
30. Id. § 3142(e).
31. Id. § 3142(e)(2).
32. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 19.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (1985).
34. Id. § 3142(e).
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the effect of this presumption.
Once the court finds that no conditions of release can reasonably
assure the community's safety, it must deny bail and detain the person
pending trial. The court must enter written findings of fact and a written
statement explaining the basis for detention.35
IH. Standards Governing Procedural Due Process
A. The Current Standard: Gerstein v. Pugh
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary (the "Committee") 36 recog-
nized that a preventive detention statute may be constitutionally defec-
tive if it fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards.37 In
determining which procedural safeguards were constitutionally man-
dated, the Committee considered two Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing pretrial restraint of liberty which provided for minimum procedural
safeguards based on the Due Process Clause.38 In Morrissey v. Brewer,39
parole was revoked for two defendants based upon written reports of
their parole officers. Both defendants challenged the allegations in infor-
mal hearings before the Parole Board. The Supreme Court held that rev-
ocation was improper without a more formal hearing. Morrissey
prescribed minimum due process requirements for a parole revocation
hearing, including the right of the parolee to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses and the right to see the evidence against him.4
In Gerstein v. Pugh,4" the respondents were arrested and detained
upon the filing of a prosecutor's information. The issue was whether a
judicial finding of probable cause was required, in addition to the prose-
cutor's information, before detaining the arrested person beyond that de-
tention which is incidental to arrest.42 The Supreme Court held that a
suspect is entitled to a timely hearing before a magistrate for "a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of
liberty following arrest."'4 3 In contrast with the confrontational rights
afforded parolees in Morrissey, however, the Court concluded that "the
35. Id. § 3142(i)(1).
36. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary was responsible for reporting on, and recom-
mending to Congress, passage of the Act.
37. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 8.
38. S. REP. No. 147, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 147].
39. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
40. Id. at 489.
41. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The arrestees in Gerstein brought a class action against the
county officials, claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable
cause. The district court agreed with respondents, ordered an immediate preliminary hearing
to determine probable cause, and ordered the county to submit a plan providing for prelimi-
nary hearings in all cases. State Attorney Gerstein petitioned the Supreme Court for review.
42. Id. at 120.
43. Id. at 114.
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full panoply of adversary safeguards-counsel, confrontation, cross-ex-
amination, and compulsory process for witnesses" is not constitutionally
required for post-arrest detainees.'
Finally, the Committee looked to see which procedural safeguards
legislators in the District of Columbia included within their 1973 preven-
tive detention statute.45 Although that statute applied only to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, it authorized, as the Committee was seeking to do, the
pretrial detention of adult defendants to protect community safety. In
1981, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the constitution-
ality of that statute in United States v. Edwards.46 In addition to a sub-
stantive due process challenge, the defendant in Edwards claimed his
procedural due process rights had been violated at the detention hearing
because he was denied his constitutional rights to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, and to utilize compulsory service of pro-
cess.4 7 Like the Senate Committee, the Court of Appeals looked to Mor-
rissey and Gerstein to determine the requirements of procedural due
process.48 The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the liberty
interest of a pretrial detainee was more like the liberty interest of a post-
arrest detainee than it was like the liberty interest of a parolee.49 In ef-
fect, then, the court had concluded that the probable cause finding re-
quired in Gerstein, rather than the more stringent requirements set out in
Morrissey, described the constitutional standard applicable in pretrial de-
tention hearings. Since the District of Columbia statute provided defend-
ants with more procedural protection than was constitutionally required
in Gerstein,5" the court in Edwards held that the statute satisfied "the
minimum demands of procedural due process before a person may be
detained pending trial on the grounds of dangerousness to the
community., 51
Although the holding in Gerstein applied only to temporary re-
straints of liberty which are incident to arrest, the Senate Committee
adopted the reasoning in Edwards and concluded that Gerstein provides
the standard for determining what procedures are required to satisfy due
process when the government seeks to detain a person pending trial.5"
According to the Committee, then, a pretrial detainee is entitled only to a
judicial determination of probable cause.
44. Id. at 119-20.
45. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1986). The statute provides, in part: "The person shall
be represented by counsel and shall be entitled to present information by proffer or otherwise,
to testify, and to present witnesses in his behalf." See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 8.
46. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
47. Id. at 1333.
48. Id. at 1334-37.
49. Id. at 1336-37.
50. See supra note 45.
51. 430 A.2d at 1333.
52. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 14-15.
B. Implications of the Gerstein Standard
The majority of courts faced with a procedural due process chal-
lenge to the Bail Reform Act have held that the Act is constitutional.53
They reason that the interests at stake in the Act's detention hearing and
in the Gerstein probable cause hearing are similar. Since the Gerstein
probable cause hearing was held to be constitutional, and since the Act's
detention hearing provides suspects with greater procedural protections,
the procedures in the Act are constitutionally sufficient. Because the
Gerstein probable cause hearing provides defendants with less protection,
however, courts regard the Act's statutory safeguards for detention hear-
ings as superfluous to constitutionally mandated procedural rights.54 The
courts may be neglecting to enforce those rights actually provided for in
the Act and asserted by defendants to protect their liberty interest.
Congress assumed that a preventive detention hearing required only
an informal probable cause determination.55 Congress nonetheless pro-
vided additional procedural safeguards in the Act to ensure that defend-
ants' constitutional rights would be protected. When faced with
constitutional challenges to the application of statutorily prescribed pro-
cedures, some courts have ended their analysis upon finding that a de-
fendant in a preventive detention hearing is afforded more protection
than a defendant in a Gerstein post-arrest hearing.56 Thus, constitutional
protections imposed statutorily by Congress are effectively disregarded
based on the Gerstein court's more limited view of the defendant's consti-
tutional rights.
The analysis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in Delker v. United States,57 illustrates this judicial unwillingness
to part with Gerstein in determining the due process protections afforded
by the Act. Defendant Delker, after being ordered detained prior to trial
on conspiracy and racketeering charges, appealed the detention order,
challenging procedures employed at the detention hearing. Delker
claimed that the court violated the statute by requiring his attorney to
proffer the testimony of his witnesses, rather than letting his witnesses
53. United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding indictment estab-
lishes probable cause); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding
indictment establishes probable cause); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir.
1985) (upholding use of hearsay and denial of defendant's right to confront non-appearing
witnesses); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 387 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding presumption
constitutional); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1985) (upholding
use of hearsay). Contra United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (D. Kan. 1986) (hold-
ing indictment not enough to establish probable cause).
54. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
55. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 15.
56. See cases cited supra note 53.
57. 757 F.2d 1390 (3d Cir. 1985).
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testify on their own." The Act grants a defendant "an opportunity to
testify, to present witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-examine witnesses
who appear at the hearing and to present information by proffer or other-
wise."5 9 Although the court noted that it was not frivolous to suggest
the conjunctive "and" meant "and", it nevertheless interpreted "and" as
"or", thus leaving the decision to hear live testimony to the court's
discretion.6"
Had the court developed a traditional due process analysis, it would
have examined the nature of the interests at stake in a detention hearing
and the reasons why Congress provided defendants the right to present
witnesses on their own behalf.61 Instead, the court relied on the Edwards
court's interpretation of the District of Columbia detention statute.
6 2
The Edwards opinion, in turn, had relied on Gerstein in finding the pro-
cedures of the District of Columbia detention statute constitutional.63
The Delker court rejected the due process challenge, concluding that
there was no need for further constitutional scrutiny. Thus, despite the
Act's facial requirement that a defendant be permitted to present his own
witnesses, the court interpreted this right to be conditioned upon the
lower court's discretion.
The Delker court did not expressly reject the congressionally man-
dated right to present live witnesses. Rather, the court concluded,
through the process of interpretation, that Congress had never intended
suspects to have an unconditional right to present witnesses. Whether
the constitution requires suspects to have the right to present live wit-
nesses is a different inquiry. For this latter inquiry, a due process analysis
is required.
As the discussion of Delker illustrates, reliance on Gerstein often
leads courts to avoid analyzing the rights actually afforded the defendant
in a detention hearing. Judge Ferren, disturbed by the discrepancy be-
58. Delker also claimed he was denied his due process rights to confront the government's
material witness and to cross-examine the government's investigating agents. Although the
court concluded that the district court should have permitted the questioning of the agents, it
considered this harmless error. Id. at 1398.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985) (emphasis added).
60. Delker, 757 F.2d at 1395.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 499-500 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
62. Delker, 757 F.2d at 1395. The right in the District of Columbia Code to present wit-
nesses on one's own behalf parallels that right in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Edwards
court relied on the following statement in the legislative history of the District of Columbia
statute: "If the court is dissatisfied with the nature of the proffer, it can always, within its
discretion, insist on direct testimony." 430 A.2d 1321, 1334 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 182, 184
(1970)).
63. Delker, 757 F.2d at 1395. The Delker court reasoned that since Congress based the
Act's procedural requirements on the District of Columbia detention statute, the constitution-
ality of the District of Columbia's statute meant that the Act's procedures were similarly con-
stitutional. Id.
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tween the procedural safeguards in the statute and those that were actu-
ally implemented, complained of his colleagues' limited analysis in
Edwards: "[Tlhe very strictness of the statute is its salvation; in fact,
elementary notions of due process require judicial amplification of the
statute in the three critical respects where the majority is lax." 4
In United States v. Salerno,65 the Second Circuit was disturbed that
Congress would grant the government the means of depriving an individ-
ual of her liberty upon a prediction of future criminality.66 Although the
Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit, it acknowledged that
an accused has a strong interest in maintaining her liberty before an adju-
dication of guilt.6 7 It is therefore unclear why Congress and the courts
have relied almost exclusively on the constitutional standards set out in
Gerstein when they interpret the extent of the Bail Reform Act's proce-
dural safeguards. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence in Gerstein,
strongly criticized the majority for attempting to specify those proce-
dural protections that constitutionally need not be accorded pretrial
detainees.68
Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile the results of such reliance
on Gerstein with the Morrissey holding, which affords parolees greater
procedural safeguards prior to parole revocation than reliance on Ger-
stein affords defendants prior to preventive detention.69 Edwards relied
on a footnote in Gerstein to distinguish the added procedural protection
given in a parole revocation hearing. That footnote provided that "revo-
cation proceedings may offer less protection from initial error than the
more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by statute and
the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a suspect with crime
unless he is satisfied of probable cause."7 Assuming the Supreme Court
had been referring to preventive detention in this footnote, this statement
would have to mean that the Court was more concerned about safeguard-
ing the liberty of a parolee, who has already been convicted of a crime,
than it was about a presumptively innocent person who has not been
convicted of the charged crime, may not in fact have committed the
crime, and may never commit a crime if released pending trial.
64. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1352 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
id. at 1351 for a discussion of Judge Ferren's three areas of criticism.
65. 794 F.2d. 64 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
66. Id. at 71-75.
67. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987).
68. Such a limited view of pretrial detainees' rights, Justice Stewart stated, would mean
"the Constitution extends less procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is
required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial bank account; the custody of a refrig-
erator; the temporary suspension of a public school student; or the suspension of a driver's
license." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring in part) (citations
omitted).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 106-109.
70. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121-22 n.22.
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The result of an erroneous parole revocation decision is that a con-
victed person returns to prison. The result of an erroneous preventive
detention decision is that a presumptively innocent person goes to prison
pending trial. The Act fails to protect from "initial error" those defend-
ants who may be detained six months or a year in prison and ultimately
are acquitted. In addition, preventive detention hampers a detainee's
ability to prepare his defense. This kind of deprivation works an irrepa-
rable harm significantly greater than that which results from an errone-
ous parole revocation decision.
C. Due Process Requirements and the Gerstein Standard
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court considered the informal
judicial finding of probable cause required by Gerstein to be the sole pro-
cedural safeguard that is constitutionally necessary for the government to
detain an accused on the basis of dangerousness, or considered it to be
only one of the necessary procedural safeguards. Because the scope of
the Gerstein decision is unclear, the decision is susceptible to various in-
terpretations.71 Several reasons support the conclusion that the Gerstein
probable cause hearing requirement is only one of possibly many proce-
dural safeguards that are constitutionally required before detaining an
individual as dangerous.
First, the defendants in Gerstein did not put their pretrial detention
into issue. The only question was what kind of probable cause determi-
nation was necessary in those cases in which the government was seeking
detention.72 The Court resolved this by comparing the prosecutor's in-
formation, the indictment, and the preliminary hearing.73 Thus, the
Court was not called upon to set out the minimum due process require-
ments in a preventive detention hearing.
Second, the specific language of the opinion does not suggest that an
accused could be subject to preventive detention on the basis of a prob-
able cause hearing alone. The opinion calls for "determination of prob-
71. In United States v. Edwards, upholding the District of Columbia preventive de-
tention statute, the majority ruled that Gerstein rather than Morrissey governed be-
cause it concerned a hearing with a similar issue: "whether the accused may be
detained pending trial." That reasoning is unconvincing. As one of the Edwards
dissenters [Judge Ferren] noted, it affords "less constitutional protection to an ac-
cused at a pretrial detention hearing than the Supreme Court has granted convicted
felons facing possible revocation of probation or parole." Moreover, he correctly
added, Gerstein is hardly analogous because it involves only a probable cause deter-
mination, which (1) is not a basis for further detention per se but only for requiring
bail; and (2) is much less complicated than the "far more complex, inherently specu-
lative prediction that the accused is likely to be dangerous in the future."
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 549 (1985) (quoting United States v. Ed-
wards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1336, 1352-53 (D.C. App. 1981)) (citations omitted).
72. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 105.
73. Id. at 116-25.
able cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty"'74 and
"determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pre-
trial restraint of liberty.""5 This language implies only the general propo-
sition that a probable cause hearing is one necessary precondition of
pretrial detention.
Third, if an informal probable cause hearing is indeed the only pro-
cedure required to satisfy due process before detaining an accused, it is
unclear why the District of Columbia detention statute and the Bail Re-
form Act require more than a probable cause finding. It is conceivable
that Congress wanted to ferret out certain defendants rather than to de-
tain every individual charged with any crime or specified crimes. The
legislative history suggests, however, that Congress was more concerned
that to deny an individual her liberty on a merely predictive basis, i.e.,
the probability that she will commit a future crime pending trial, would
be unconstitutional in the absence of significant procedural safeguards.76
The Court in Gerstein noted that the nature and consequences of a par-
ticular determination dictate which procedures are appropriate:
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the
lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by
the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine
resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a
preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a rea-
sonable belief in guilt.77
This language suggests that an informal probable cause determina-
tion represents only part of the procedures needed to satisfy due process.
A hearing under the Act goes beyond Gerstein's informal factfinding by
requiring clear and convincing evidence as a precondition for pretrial
detention.78
Fourth, the Supreme Court itself recently described the procedures
in a Gerstein hearing as necessary to effect "limited postarrest deten-
tion."179 It is unlikely that Justice Rehnquist was referring to a poten-
tially extensive pretrial detention when he used this phrase.80
Thus, Gerstein's probable cause finding may be a necessary prerequi-
site to detaining an individual on the basis of dangerousness, but is not,
in and of itself, constitutionally sufficient. It is necessary, therefore, to
74. Id. at 114.
75. Id. at 125.
76. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 8.
77. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985).
79. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2104 (1987).
80. Detention under the Act can be quite lengthy. See, eg., United States v. Zannino, 798
F.2d 544 (Ist Cir. 1986) (defendant with a cardiac condition detained over sixteen months
under the Act).
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examine the nature and consequences of a finding of dangerousness to
determine which procedural protections are required to satisfy due
process.
D. Determining Due Process Standards
The Gerstein probable cause determination fails to establish the facts
necessary to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard required
by the Bail Reform Act. Additional factfinding procedures are therefore
necessary. To determine which factfinding procedures were appropriate
in Gerstein, the Supreme Court looked both to the nature of the interest
at stake in a post-arrest detention and the consequences of depriving an
individual of her post-arrest liberty.81 We must, therefore, proceed with
a similar due process analysis in light of the interests that are at stake in
the pretrial detention context.
1. Predicting Future Criminality
The courts have distinguished detention based on dangerousness
from detention based on a risk of flight or obstruction of justice.82
Though any pretrial detention significantly restrains an accused's liberty,
the predictive tools for making the determinations vary greatly.
The determination of flight risk has always been based primarily on
the seriousness of the crime charged.83 Traditionally, judges were author-
ized to detain, pending trial, defendants charged with capital crimes.84
Courts reasoned that people facing the death penalty were unlikely to
return for trial. Since there are now far fewer capital crimes, modern
courts have extended pretrial detention to noncapital offenders charged
with serious crimes. Since the probability of flight will generally increase
with the seriousness of the charge, courts have adopted a moderate pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard to determine flight risk.85 The rea-
81. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120-21.
82. Compare United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985) (risk of flight
need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence) with United States v. Hazime, 762
F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985) (danger to the community must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence).
83. See S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 5; see generally Duker, The Right to BaiL" A
Historical Inquiry, 42 AL. L. REv. 33 (1977).
84. Section 9 of Virginia's Constitution in 1785, for example, specified that "those shall be
let to bail who are apprehended for any crime not punishable in life or limb .... But if a crime
be punishable by life or limb, or it be manslaughter and there be good cause to believe the
party guilty thereof, he shall not be admitted to bail." Duker, supra note 83, at 81 (citing 12
Va. Stat. 185-86 (W. Hening ed., 1823)). Historically, all serious crimes were considered capi-
tal offenses.
85. Though Congress was silent on the evidence standard in flight risk cases, the courts
have inferred a preponderance of the evidence standard by default. United States v. Fortna,
769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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sonableness of this rule as a general principle does not imply that in any
given case involving a serious crime the accused is necessarily likely to
flee. While the risk of flight is rationally related to the seriousness of the
crime charged, 6 the defendant may assert strong community ties to op-
pose the detention. 7
A determination that a defendant will obstruct justice if released
pending trial requires an affirmative act on the part of the defendant,
such as a threat to a particular witness or judicial officer."8 Detention is
justified when the court determines that the defendant is likely to carry
out actual threats. The use of this predictive determination has not gen-
erated significant criticism.
More attenuated reasoning underlies the prediction that an accused
is likely to commit additional crimes if released pending trial. Congress
passed the Act in part based on studies evidencing "significant"8 9 recidi-
vism by various classes of persons on some form of release. These statis-
tics deserve close scrutiny. Nineteen studies included in the Act's
legislative history reported recidivism rates ranging from 7% to 70%.'0
The study that cited a 70% recidivism rate was denounced by five of its
eleven authors as having little probative value.91 Few of the studies spec-
ified original offenses or offenses committed while on release. All but one
study limited the recidivism inquiry to charge or indictment rate, rather
than conviction rate.92 Finally, the majority of the studies were con-
ducted in the District of Columbia, where the recidivism rate tended to
be much higher than the national statistics.93
Moreover, the Committee apparently engaged in a selective presen-
tation of the statistics. For example, one study was conducted from 1967
to 1968. The Committee looked only to the figures during the first half of
86. "The only bases for detention that can rationally be said to arise with a criminal
charge and vanish with an acquittal are those directly related to the demands of judicial ad-
ministration-a risk of flight, witness or jury intimidation, evidence of destruction, or other
interference with trial." Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 406 (1970).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1985).
88. See United States v. Ruggiero, 796 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendant's courtroom
threats to witnesses constituted attempt to obstruct justice).
89. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 22.
90. Id. at 22-30.
91. The figure measured only "rearrests without regard to conviction or acquittal ......
Tribe, supra note 86, at 372 n.3.
92. Since law enforcement officials tend to suspect known convicts of new crimes rather
than unidentified individuals, this definition of recidivism is problematic. Conviction rates
provide a more objective indication of actual recidivism.
93. Of the studies cited in the legislative history, the average rate of recidivism in the
District of Columbia was approximately 26%, as compared to an 11% average in the non-
District of Columbia studies. See generally S. RP. No. 147, supra note 38.
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1967 and found a 9% recidivism rate.94 Professor Tribe examined the
1968 figures of that same study and cited a 5.9% recidivism rate.95 Had
the Committee reported the final results of the study, rather than identi-
fying the single highest half-year period, the result would have been sig-
nificantly lower.
The Committee also cited a study by the District of Columbia Crime
Commission which found that 7.5% of all persons released pending trial
on felony charges were subsequently rearrested on one or more felony
charges.96 Referring to that study, Tribe noted that "only 4.5% of the
defendants [in that study] were arrested for crimes of actual or potential
violence."19 7 Finally, although noticing that the studies indicated a 7 to
20% recidivism rate, the Committee speculated that the true rate is prob-
ably much higher, considering how little crime is actually reported.98
If we assume that the national pretrial recidivism average is between
7 and 20%, as the studies reported by the Committee indicated, this still
suggests a potential margin of error of up to ten inappropriate confine-
ments to one appropriate confinement if all defendants in any class are
detained. 99 Are we willing to jail presumptively innocent people to keep.
a small percentage of potentially dangerous people off the streets? One
scholar has replied that "such approaches do not address the sizeable
margins of error associated with detention caused by their use."'" There
is no reliable way to distinguish between those who will and will not
commit crimes pending trial.''
Pretrial detention on the ground that a defendant may be dangerous
is not only unreliable, but raises serious constitutional questions. One
scholar has commented that "the inescapably poor record associated
with any use of incapacitative measures must be confronted, especially
94. Id. at 25 (citing THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMM. TO STUDY THE OPERATION OF THE
BAIL REFORM ACT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (THE HART CoMMITTEE), REPORT
(1968-1969)).
95. Tribe, supra note 86, at 371-72 & n.3.
96. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 23 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CRIME IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNITED STATES REPORT 596 (1966)).
97. Tribe, supra note 86, at 372 n.3.
98. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 30.
99. See Angel, Green, Kaufman & Van Loon, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 300, 317 (1971).
100. Goldkamp, supra note 8, at 29-30 (citation omitted).
101. Lawrence Tribe has noted the self-fulfilling tendency of a detention rationale:
[W]hen the system detains persons who could safely have been released, its errors
will be invisible. Since no detained defendant will commit a public offense, each
decision to detain fulfills the prophecy that is thought to warrant it, while any deci-
sion to release may be refuted by its results.
The inevitable consequence is a continuing pressure to broaden the system in
order to reach ever more potential detainees. Indeed, this pressure will be generated
by the same fears that made preventive detention seem attractive in the first place.
Tribe, supra note 86, at 375.
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because of the questionable effectiveness of due process measures at this
stage of the system."'0 z Thus, unless we have procedures that improve
the fact-finding process, we risk detaining many more people than is war-
ranted. There has already been a 32% increase in detentions since the
Act was passed. 103
2. Conditioning Deprivation of Parolee's and Pretrial Detainee's Liberty
Upon Finding of Dangerousness
While the tools for determining dangerousness are inherently pre-
dictive and unreliable, the Supreme Court upheld a parole revocation
procedure involving similar predictions of dangerousness.104
The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly
retrospective factual question: whether the parolee has in fact ac-
ted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole. Only if it
is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the
second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison
or should other steps be taken to protect society and improve
chances of rehabilitation? The first step is relatively simple; the
second... question involves the application of expertise by the parole
authority in making a prediction as to the ability of the individual to
live in society without committing antisocial acts. This part of the
decision, too, depends on facts, and therefore it is important for the
board to know not only that some violation was committed but
also to know accurately how many and how serious the violations
were. Yet this second step, deciding what to do about the violation
once it is identified, is not purely factual but also predictive and
discretionary.'0 5
Given the need for a probable cause determination and a discretion-
ary decision on whether the person will be dangerous to society, the
Supreme Court in Morrissey found it necessary to provide procedural
safeguards to encourage a responsible approach to this difficult, discre-
tionary decision. Referring to the revocation hearing, the Court stated,
"[t]his hearing must be the basis for more than determining probable
cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts
and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revoca-
tion."'0 6 The Court then proceeded to lay out the minimum require-
ments of due process:
[These requirements] include (a) written notice of the claimed vio-
lations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against
him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
102. Goldkamp, supra note 8, at 51.
103. Law Allowing Denial of Bail Provokes Debate on Rights, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1986, at
A12, col. 5.
104. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
105. Id. at 479-80 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 488.
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and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and de-
tached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and rea-
sons for revoking parole."°7
The Court held that finding a violation of the parole conditions was
only the first stage in revoking a parolee's conditional liberty. 1 8 The ad-
ded procedural safeguards were provided to assure that the decision to
revoke parole was made on an informed factual basis which indicated
that the parolee cannot be released without his committing antisocial
acts. 109
These Morrissey procedures were developed to improve the reliabil-
ity of the necessarily predictive dangerousness determination. The lib-
erty of both accused and convicted persons is conditioned upon a judicial
finding that they are not dangerous. Logically then, an accused in a pre-
ventive detention hearing should receive at least the procedural safe-
guards provided in Morrissey.
3. Consequences of a Pretrial Deprivation of Liberty
The procedural due process analysis also requires examining the
consequences of depriving an individual of her pretrial liberty.110 The
Supreme Court in Gerstein compared the result of an erroneous parole
revocation to the "lesser consequences"II of a probable cause determina-
tion. Unlike Gerstein's temporary detention incident to arrest, pretrial
detention under the Act may last 14 months 2 or more. While the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York juvenile
detention statute,1 13 that statute limited detention to a maximum period
of seventeen days.
The consequences of a preventive detention order are more severe
than either a probable cause determination or detention under a statute
with a seventeen day maximum, and, therefore, require significantly
more care in the decisionmaking process. The procedures set forth in
Morrissey provide the judicial system with the means to make a more
reliable decision.
107. Id. at 489.
108. Id. at 479-81.
109. Id. at 480.
110. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975).
111. Id.
112. 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1041 (Dec. 10, 1986) (referring to the defendants in United
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986)). See also supra note 80.
113. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (upholding N.Y. JUD. LAw § 320.5(3)(b)
(McKinney 1983).
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E. Summary
The interests involved in a parole revocation hearing are analogous
to those in a preventive detention hearing. Congress, in assessing the
procedural requirements necessary to provide defendants with due pro-
cess, erroneously equated the interests at stake in a probable cause hear-
ing with those in a detention hearing, and thus assumed that Gerstein
provided the minimum due process standards.
Regardless whether Gerstein or Morrissey represents the threshhold
due process requirements in a preventive detention hearing, Congress has
provided defendants with a set of procedural safeguards that exceed
those set forth in Gerstein. The legislative intent was "to afford great
flexibility to the judicial officer in deciding the question of detention."' 1 4
The courts, in facing constitutional challenges to the interpretation and
application of those procedures, have a responsibility to interpret strictly
and enforce the procedural safeguards. It is not enough to presume con-
stitutionality on its face because the procedures in the statute exceed Ger-
stein requirements. As Professor Tribe has noted:
[T]he Court's grant of a strong presumption of constitutionality to
statutory procedural provisions amount[s] to a serious abdication
of traditional notions of judicial responsibility under the due pro-
cess clauses .... The proper role of the courts in this context is to
define and protect those substantive and procedural rights that
may not receive their due respect in the political process.115
III. Procedural Due Process as Applied
Congress intended the dangerousness provisions of the Act to apply
to a "narrowly identified group of defendants"11 6 who pose a real and
serious threat to the safety of the community. Since the accused can
present "nothing [but] assurances of his own good intentions"' 11 7 to con-
vince the court that he will not commit or continue crimes pending trial,
the Act provides defendants with procedural protections to aid them in
making this showing.
Effective implementation of these procedural safeguards would pre-
vent widespread abuse of the courts' power to detain. Congress drafted
the Act, however, in a way that leaves these procedures and their corre-
sponding protected rights vulnerable to government circumvention. Ju-
dicial interpretation of the Act placing certain procedural protections
114. United States v. Knight, 636 F. Supp. 1462, 1466 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
115. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 542-43 (1977).
116. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 6-7. "It is a mistake to apply the detention provi-
sions of this Act broadly; the legislative history clearly indicates Congress' understanding that
it would be used against a 'limited group of offenders."' United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp.
1043, 1049-50 (D. Kan. 1986).
117. Tribe, supra note 86, at 393.
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within the discretion of the courts has not gone unobserved. One district
judge noted:
Because of this Court's opinion that some courts have misun-
derstood Congressional intent in authorizing pretrial detention of
certain criminal suspects . . . and because the Court decries the
disparate treatment of criminal defendants that can follow from
misguided application of such a statute,... [i]t is this Court's in-
tention ... to set out considerations guiding the application of the
Act in the hope of bringing its invocation more closely in line with
the purpose for which it was enacted. 118
This section identifies various procedures, which, by a process of
interpretation and application, fail to safeguard defendants' rights in the
detention hearing. The section first examines how the courts interpret
and apply the procedures in light of the constitutional standards set out
in Gerstein. It then suggests how the procedures could be implemented
more effectively by examining the legislative history, principles of due
process, and the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Morrissey.
A. Probable Cause Finding
A finding of probable cause is particularly important in the use of
pretrial detention based on dangerousness, which is limited to defendants
who are charged with one of four categories of offenses.11 9 The Act re-
fers to probable cause only once:
Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of the commu-
nity if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe
that the person [committed a drug offense punishable by at least
ten years in prison or carried a firearm during the commission of a
felony]. 120
The critical question is whether the judicial officer must hold an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine that probable cause exists or whether she
may rely on the probable cause finding in an indictment. At least five
circuits have held that the judicial officer may rely on the indictment to
establish probable cause.' 21
One compelling argument supporting this interpretation rests on the
118. Cox, 635 F. Supp. at 1049.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (1985).
120. Id. § 3142(e) (emphasis added).
121. United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Domin-
guez, 783 F.2d 702, 706 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Hurtaflo, 779 F.2d 1467, 1477-79 (1 lth Cir. 1985); United States v.
Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.
1985). Contra United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1052-53 (D. Kan. 1986).
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elevated status of the grand jury as an "instrument of justice."' 22 If a
"duly constituted and unbiased grand jury" '123 issues a constitutionally
sufficient indictment, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Contreras
124
reasoned, a judicial officer should not undermine the prosecutorial pro-
cess with a contrary finding in a detention hearing. 125 This view com-
ports with Gerstein, which held that a judicial finding of probable cause is
constitutionally required as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest,'26 but that "a grand jury's judgment [may] substitute
for that of a neutral and detached magistrate"' 27 because of "the grand
jury's relationship to the courts and its historical role of protecting indi-
viduals from unjust prosecution."' 28 Thus, probable cause may be estab-
lished by an indictment in the absence of contrary congressional
intent. 129
Critics of this interpretation raise several arguments. First, the Act
clearly requires that a judicial officer find probable cause. If Congress
had wanted to create an automatic presumption whenever an indictment
was returned, it easily could have said so. 3'
Second, the legislative history supports the view that an independent
evidentiary hearing must be conducted by the judicial officer. In requir-
ing probable cause rather than the more stringent "substantial
probability" requirement, the Committee assumed the judicial officer
would make an independent determination.' Although the Committee
wanted to assure the validity of the charges against the defendant, it was
also concerned that the government could not meet a substantial
probability standard at the defendant's first court appearance. The Com-
mittee required the judicial finding of probable cause instead of the more
stringent "substantial probability" finding, intending that the former
would provide the equivalent assurance that the accused committed the
122. Contreras, 776 F.2d at 55 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956)).
123. Id. at 54.
124. 776 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985).
125. Id. at 54-55.
126. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
127. Id. at 117 n.19.
128. Id.
129. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985).
130. "[T]he majority opinion .... in effect, rewrites the statute to read that the presump-
tion shall come into play 'if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that
the person committed an offense or if a grand jury has indicted the person.'" Id. at 1483
(Clark, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (D. Kan. 1986).
131. While this "substantial probability" requirement might give some additional
measure of protection against the possibility of allowing pretrial detention of defend-
ants who are ultimately acquitted, the Committee is satisfied that the fact that the
judicial officer has to find probable cause will assure the validity of the charges
against the defendant, and that any additional assurance provided by a "substantial
probability" test is outweighed by the practical problems in meeting this requirement
at the stage at which the pretrial detention hearing is held.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 18 (emphasis added).
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charged crime.' 32 Thus, it appears that Congress envisioned a judicial
finding of probable cause independent of an indictment.
Third, the Act requires the judicial officer to take into account the
weight of the evidence against the person in determining whether there
are conditions of release that reasonably will assure the safety of the com-
munity. 133 The judicial officer cannot weigh the evidence linking the de-
fendant to the alleged crime if she relies on the indictment. 13
Fourth, in some instances, the probable cause finding creates a pre-
sumption in favor of detention. One district court held that when dealing
with such a fundamental right as liberty, without the traditional safe-
guards of a criminal trial, a heavier standard for establishing probable
cause is required.
135
Finally, many critics view grand juries as no more than a "rubber
stamp" for the prosecutor. 136 An experienced prosecutor controls the
grand jury process and can get the grand jury to indict virtually anybody,
at any time, for any reason.' 37 The historical importance of grand juries
notwithstanding, their role as protectors of individual liberty has eroded
in modem times. 138 Despite this trend, courts continue to perceive the
grand jury process as an exalted method for getting at the truth. 39
The argument that an indictment satisfies the required probable
cause finding in a detention hearing is superficially appealing. The role of
grand juries as protectors of individual liberty traditionally has been
viewed as a way to protect defendants' rights."4 Yet, in the context of
preventive detention hearings, the protection of an indictment is not only
illusory, but may, in fact, prevent defendants from realizing those
132. This interpretation is further supported by a footnote in the legislative history:
Because of the requirements of Rules 4(a) and 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, probable cause that the defendant committed the offense with which
he is charged must be established either prior to, or at the time of, the initial appear-
ance. Furthermore, the issue of probable cause will subsequently be reexamined in
the course of a preliminary hearing or in proceedings leading to the filing of an
indictment.
Id. at 18 n.57.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2) (1985).
134. United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
135. Cox, 635 F. Supp. at 1052.
136. Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1485 (Clark, J., dissenting); W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 71, at 618, 622.
137. Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1485 n.6 (Clark, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. For example, while the Third Circuit in United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1986) expressed "grave" doubts as to whether the finding of probable cause may be based on a
proffer of evidence by the government, it held that an indictment alone was sufficient to sup-
port a finding of probable cause. Id. at 118-19. Yet, an indictment need be no more than a
proffer of evidence by the government. The court was concerned about an historical distinc-
tion with no modern significance.
140. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975).
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rights. 141
There are persuasive arguments in favor of an independent eviden-
tiary hearing to determine probable cause. Given that the government
can use an indictment to undermine the Act's procedural safeguards and
render defendants' rights meaningless, 142 the use of an indictment to es-
tablish probable cause must conflict with the congressional intent of the
Act. Courts should assure that procedural safeguards provided in the
Act are given meaning. Courts have expressed concern that a separate
probable cause hearing would be used by the defense as an inappropriate
discovery device. " Such concerns, however, suggest an abdication of
judicial responsibility: the safeguards created by the Act are not subject
to implicit judicial veto. Burdens on the judiciary of a more time con-
suming hearing are outweighed by congressionally created protections of
defendants' rights and by preservation of the integrity of the factfinding
process.
B. Cross-Examining Witnesses
The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is a fun-
141. Consider the following scenario:
Defendant D is charged with armed robbery. Upon a finding of probable cause
to believe that D committed the armed robbery, a rebuttable presumption arises that
no conditions of release can reasonably assure that D will not commit another crime.
Co-defendant S is the government's only witness and is promised a reduced sentence
in return for cooperation. Prosecutor P tells the grand jury that he has an "eyewit-
ness" who saw D rob the bank. P, in his enthusiasm to prosecute his first big case,
misstates the law. The grand jury indicts D on the basis of P's proffer that S con-
fessed. The judicial officer adopts the indictment as probable cause that D robbed
the bank. The rebuttable presumption arises and the burden shifts to D to prove that
she will not commit any crimes pending trial. D requests that the government's
witness be brought into court for cross-examination. The court denies D's request
because the statute only affords her the right to cross-examine witnesses who appear
at the hearing. D has no idea what evidence the government has against her, nor is
she aware that P misstated the law, since she has no access to the grand jury tran-
script. D denies the charges and proffers assurances that she is not a danger to the
community. Thus, D is actually detained on the basis of a self-motivated co-defend-
ant and legal misstatements.
The use of the indictment to establish probable cause in the above scenario defeated the
defendant's right to cross-examine the witness against her and virtually nullified her ability to
rebut the presumption in favor of detention. Had the judicial officer demanded an independent
probable cause hearing, she would have discovered the questionable credibility of the witness.
However, a discovery of the prosecutor's misstated legal principles may have mooted any fur-
ther inquiry.
142. Justice Marshall has criticized the use of indictments to prove probable cause. "The
conclusion is inescapable that the indictment has been turned into evidence, if not that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then that left to his own devices he will soon be guilty
of something else. 'If it suffices to accuse, what will become of the innocent?'" United States
v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2110 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1985).
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damental aspect of our adversarial system. 1" Although the Committee
believed that providing suspects with the means to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses exceeded the due process requirements in a
detention hearing,145 it did afford defendants the limited opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses "who appear at the hearing."' 46 The Committee
also provided that defendants could "present information by proffer or
otherwise."147 Courts in at least seven circuits have held that the govern-
ment also may proceed by proffer.148 Courts in at least four circuits have
held that defendants may not confront non-appearing government wit-
nesses. 49 Thus, the government can protect its weak witnesses from
confrontation by declining to produce them at the hearing. If the court
will allow the government to proffer the testimony of these witnesses, a
fundamental protection of the defendant is circumvented and these com-
plementary evidentiary rules allow factfinding of doubtful reliability.
One might ask what meaning the right to cross-examine really has
in light of these holdings. The answer depends on how the courts ad-
dress two critical issues: (1) the type of hearsay, if any, that should be
admissible; and (2) the meaning of "appear" under the Act.
144. Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and
the reasonableness of the action depends on factfindings, the evidence used to prove
the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportu-
nity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary
evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We
have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination. They have ancient roots.... This Court has been zealous to protect
these rights from erosion.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 498 n.9 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959) (citations omitted)).
145. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 14-15.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985).
147. Id. § 3142(f). For the definition of "proffer", see supra note 28.
148. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Portes, 786
F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Cardenas, 784 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Martir, 782
F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos,
755 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Baldinger, No. 3:85-31 (M.D. Tenn. 1985);
United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602
F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1453-54
(N.D. Ill. 1984). See also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1337-39 (D.C. App. 1981)
(en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (referring to the District of Columbia detention
statute).
149. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 207-08; United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479-
80 (11th Cir. 1985) (denial of confrontation right was harmless error); Delker, 757 F.2d at
1397-98; Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 500. See also Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1338 (interpreting identi-
cal provisions in the District of Columbia detention statute).
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When faced with defendants' hearsay objections, some courts rely
on the fact that the rules of evidence concerning admissibility do not
apply to the presentation and consideration of information in preventive
detention hearings. 1 ° This position is further supported by the use of
informal procedures approved in Gerstein, 5' and the need to make bail
decisions quickly, without turning the bail hearing into a "full-fledged
trial or defendant's discovery expedition."' 52
In a law review article, one federal magistrate responded to the use
of government hearsay with a fairness argument. "While the rules of
evidence do not apply, principles of due process and fairness do, and it
behooves any judicial officer to require the government not to exceed the
bounds of fairness by the use of triple hearsay to establish probable
cause."
153
The Act specifically grants defendants the right to proceed by prof-
fer, but makes no mention of a parallel government right.154 Moreover,
although Gerstein approved the use of informal procedures in making a
probable cause determination, Congress specifically provided defendants
with the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who appear.1 55
Courts have attempted to develop ways to salvage defendants' op-
portunity to cross-examine witnesses. Some courts have upheld the gov-
ernment's use of hearsay while retaining discretion to require supporting
evidence when the credibility of the hearsay is questionable." 6 Thus,
although the government still can prohibit a defendant's cross-examina-
tion by presenting its evidence by proffer, these courts believe this discre-
tionary rule assures reliable government evidence.
This method does not always assure reliability. In United States v.
Cardenas,151 the defendant asserted that the government's proffered in-
formation was incorrect. The magistrate decided to hear live testimony
and the government withdrew the allegedly incorrect information.15 8 In
Cardenas, the defendant had the opportunity to inform the judicial of-
ficer that the hearsay was unreliable. However, when unreliable state-
ments are made in the secrecy of grand jury hearings or When the
defendant cannot discern that the proffered statements are false without
cross-examining the witness, the courts do not have the benefit of an ad-
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985). See, e.g., Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 207.
151. See, e.g., Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. at 1454.
152. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 207-08.
153. Powers, Detention Under the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 21 CRIM. L. BULL.
413, 417 (1985).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985). See also United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 118 (3d
Cir. 1986).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1985).
156. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Delker,
757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985).
157. 784 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 938.
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versarial exchange to provoke a suspicion that the proffered evidence is
unreliable. Hence they cannot assure reliability in the factfinding pro-
cess. The defects inherent in this method suggest that absent a compel-
ling reason, the courts should prefer live testimony, subject to cross-
examination, when a defendant's liberty is at stake. The familiar unrelia-
bility of hearsay evidence should not be allowed to undermine defend-
ants' rights. Because "[t]he likelihood of accurate fact ascertainment in
the absence of testimonial evidence, cross-examination, and an impartial
decisionmaker is palpably slim,""' the courts should not sacrifice relia-
bility in order to prevent a full blown trial.
In addressing the second issue, the meaning of witnesses who "ap-
pear", courts have held that only those witnesses who testify at the bail
hearing "appear" for purposes of cross-examination.1 60 The government
can, and often does, proffer its entire case without presenting any live
witnesses, thereby protecting possibly weak evidence from effective con-
frontation. 161 Admittedly, the Act does not provide defendants with the
right to complete confrontation which is available at a trial or a prelimi-
nary hearing. However, the right to confront and the right to cross-ex-
amine are so inextricably intertwined that without one, the other is
virtually meaningless. 162
A compromise position adopted by some courts allows the defend-
ant to cross-examine non-appearing government witnesses when she can
make a proffer to the court indicating how the witness' testimony on
cross-examination will negate the government's contention that the de-
fendant is a danger to the community. 63 This practice is of little avail,
however, since the defendant is precluded from cross-examining the wit-
ness for the purpose of impeaching her credibility.'6 Thus, although the
defendants in United States v. Accetturo 165 proffered evidence that the
government's primary witness had a long criminal record, was a drug
addict, and had a history of psychiatric disorders, the Third Circuit de-
159. Subrin & Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends,
9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449, 471-72 (1974).
160. United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479-80 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1986). Defendant
Suppa was detained upon the proffer of an Assistant United States Attorney that an eyewitness
would testify about Suppa's drug proceeds and transactions. The government conceded on
appeal that this eyewitness really got his "direct information" from Suppa's co-conspirators.
162. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The right to confront evidence at trial encom-
passes the right of a defendant to see the evidence against her, as well as the right to cross-
examine witnesses who appear at trial.
163. Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388; Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1479-80.
164. Accetturo, 783 F.2d at 388; United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1338 (D.C.
App. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (referring to the similar District of
Columbia detention statute).
165. 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
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clined to compel the witness' appearance.166 The defendants' request
was denied because "[tlhere was no reason to believe [the witness] would
give evidence favorable to [defendants] or would retract information
harmful to them. [Defendants] wished his presence only because they
hoped visual observation of [the witness] would enhance their other evi-
dence tending to show his unreliability." 167 It is difficult to imagine evi-
dence more favorable to a defendant than an unreliable primary
government witness.
This problem is compounded in cases in which the rebuttable pre-
sumption arises on the basis of a probable cause finding. The Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Hurtado 168 noted:
[W]hen the question is whether the defendant has successfully re-
butted the presumption . .. [fjactor (g)(2) [of section 3142] per-
mits169 the magistrate or the trial judge to consider 'the weight of
the evidence against the person.' In order to make that determina-
tion, it may well be necessary to open up the issue of probable
cause since that too is a question of evidentiary weight. At that
point the defendant is guaranteed by subsection (f) the various
rights noted above, including the right to cross-examine govern-
ment witnesses whose testimony led to the evidentiary finding of
probable cause. 170
After acknowledging that the defendants' request to confront the
government's witnesses was proper and necessary to rebut the presump-
tion, the court in Hurtado deemed the lower court's failure to grant the
defendants' request harmless error.171 Thus, the denial of a procedural
safeguard acknowledged by the court as necessary and expressly pro-
vided for by Congress was virtually ignored.
Courts have been less than diligent in striking a fair balance between
the government's use of hearsay and the defendant's right to cross-ex-
amine witnesses. This tendency to exercise discretion in favor of the gov-
ernment suggests a judicial view that since the Act provides the
defendant with more than the Gerstein minimum due process rights, po-
tential abrogation of those additional, statutory rights is not of serious
concern. However, parolees 172 and probationers 173 receive more protec-
tion in revocation hearings than defendants in preventive detention hear-
166. Id. at 388.
167. Id.
168. 779 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1985).
169. The Act requires, rather than permits, the judicial officer to consider the four factors
set out in the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3 142 (g) (1985).
170. Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1479-80.
171. Id. at 1480.
172. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
173. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (holding that probation revocation hearings
must provide probationers the same minimum due process protections as are provided in pa-
role revocation hearings).
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ings.' 74 Given that revocation hearings also involve a prediction of
danger to the community, detention hearings should be structured to re-
quire at least the same degree of reliability in the factfinding process.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bell' set out a balancing
test to determine when courts should allow the defendant the right of
confrontation:
[W]here the government demonstrates that the burden of produc-
ing live testimony would be inordinate and offers in its place hear-
say evidence that is demonstrably reliable, it has made a strong
showing of good cause. Where, on the other hand, the government
neither shows that presenting live testimony would be unreasona-
bly burdensome nor offers hearsay evidence that bears indicia of
reliability, the probationer is entitled to confrontation.176
The defendant in Bell had allegedly violated his probation condi-
tions by possessing drugs. The court applied the above-described "good
cause test" to the government's evidence, holding that all but one portion
of the testimony met the requirements. The court found that the urinal-
ysis laboratory reports bore "substantial indicia of reliability." '77 The
court was more skeptical of the police reports of Bell's arrest and found
them to be generally unreliable as to whether the allegations of criminal
conduct were true.'78 Yet, because Bell's admissions corroborated the
information contained in the police reports, the reports were found to be
reliable in that particular incident.'79 The court held, however, that a
previous probation officer's testimony regarding a police investigation of
Bell was not sufficiently reliable to defeat Bell's right to confrontation. 1 0
The court found no showing by the government that "producing the live
testimony of the police officers involved would have presented any signifi-
cant difficulty," since they lived in the same state as Bell. 8
The Eighth Circuit imposed strict reliability requirements in the
probation revocation hearing. 82  Both Morrissey and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli 183 guaranteed parolees and probationers the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the hearing officer specifi-
cally finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.1 84 Courts have no
greater interest in preventing detention hearings from becoming full-
blown trials than they do in the case of parole and probation revocation
174. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
175. 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986).
176. Id. at 643.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 643-44.
179. Id. at 644.
180. Id. at 645.
181. Id. at 644-45.
182. Id. at 643-45.
183. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
184. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782.
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hearings.1 85 The "good cause test" employed in parole and probation
revocation hearings reconciles the competing needs for speedy yet relia-
ble hearings. The seriousness of the defendant's liberty interest and the
importance of accurate factfinding in the judicial process should compel
the courts to adopt the parole and probation revocation hearings model
in structuring the detention hearing.
Finally, some courts have suggested that when the government
needs to keep information confidential, it may present its case in cam-
era 186 to protect potential witnesses.1 8 7 However, the Third Circuit in
Accetturo found reliance on in camera evidence inconsistent with the
Act's procedural protections. 18 8 The court distinguished such evidence
from hearsay on the grounds that in camera evidence lessens a defend-
ant's ability to know what information the government is using against
her, as well as her ability to challenge the reliability of the evidence and
provide contrary information.18 9 The court suggested that it would ac-
cept the use of in camera evidence only when there is "a most compelling
need and no alternative means of meeting that need." 190
This refusal to permit in camera evidence absent a compelling rea-
son illustrates how a responsible judicial officer can and must prevent the
government from circumventing the Act's procedures for safeguarding
the rights of presumptively innocent defendants. 191
C. Rebuttable Presumption of Dangerousness
The most controversial provisions of the Act are the two evidentiary
presumptions. 192 The second and more frequently invoked presumption
of dangerousness 193 arises upon a finding by the judicial officer that there
is probable cause to believe the individual either committed a drug of-
185. To the contrary, the Supreme Court recently announced that prior to detention, there
must be "a full blown adversary hearing." United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103
(1987).
186. "In chambers; in private. A cause is said to be heard in camera either When the
hearing is had before the judge in his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded
from the courtroom." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1983). In the detention hear-
ing, the defendant would also be excluded from the in camera inspection of the evidence.
187. United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 208-09 (1st Cir. 1985); United States
v. Cardenas, 784 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1986).
188. United States v. Acetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 390 (3d Cir. 1986).
189. Id. at 390-91.
190. Id. at 391.
191. In referring to the government's use of in camera evidence, the court in Accetturo
stated that "[w]hile this may have been effective from the government's point of view, we think
it would seriously undermine the integrity of our criminal justice system to sanction this ap-
proach." Id. at 391 n.2.
192. See United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (D. Kan. 1986).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1985). The first rebuttable presumption arises when the accused
has recently been convicted of a felony which was committed while on release pending trial for
another offense. Because this presumption is rarely used, all references are to the more com-
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fense subject to a maximum sentence of ten years or more or the individ-
ual carried a firearm during the commission of a felony. More confusion
and conflict exists in the courts regarding the effect of this presumption
than with any other aspect of the Act. 194 Courts face challenges con-
cerning the allocation and application of the burden of proof, the method
of presentation and content of a defendant's rebuttal evidence, and the
appropriate evidentiary standard to detain a person on the basis of dan-
gerousness. Neither the Act nor its legislative history provides much
guidance for resolution of these issues. Courts have looked to the rules of
evidence and the congressional intent underlying the Act to construe and
apply the rebuttable presumption.
The predominant judicial construction of the presumption requires
courts to detain an individual on the basis of a probable cause finding if
the defendant produces no evidence to rebut the presumption.195 This
construction has enabled the government to use the presumption as its
most powerful preventive detention tool. The following section of this
Note questions the constitutionality of this presumption on its face and
as construed, and suggests an alternative, constitutional construction.
L Constitutionality of the Presumption in a Criminal Context
Inferences or "permissive presumptions" are common evidentiary
devices in the criminal factfinding context. 196 A permissive presumption
is one which "allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to infer the
elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which
places no burden of any kind on the defendant." 19 7 To test the validity of
such a presumption, the Supreme Court has required an analysis of the
presumption as it is applied to the defendant making the challenge.198
A true or "mandatory" presumption, on the other hand, is "a far
more troublesome evidentiary device." '199 "[lit tells the trier that he or
they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least
unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the
presumed connection between the two facts. ' '2"" The validity of a
mandatory presumption must be examined "on its face to determine the
monly applied second presumption. Much of the analysis which follows is also applicable to
the first presumption.
194. See Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 725 (1985).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States
v. Volksen, 766 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Viers, 637 F. Supp. 1343, 1351
(W.D. Ky. 1986).
196. County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
197. Id.
'198. Id.
199. Id. "It is probable that in a criminal case, the United States Constitution forbids the
use against the accused of a presumption that has a mandatory effect until sufficient rebuttal
evidence is presented." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 51 (1978).
200. Ulster, 442 U.S. at 157.
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extent to which the basic and elemental facts coincide."20 ' The presump-
tion in the Bail Reform Act requires detention if left unrebutted, thus
constituting a mandatory presumption. The validity of the presumption
must, therefore, be analyzed on its face.202
A mandatory criminal presumption "must be regarded as 'irra-
tional' or 'arbitrary', and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be
said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. ' 203 Ap-
plying this test to the Act's presumption, the inquiry becomes whether a
defendant, accused of a drug offense or possession of a gun during the
commission of a felony, is more likely than not to commit or continue a
crime, pending trial. "More likely than not" suggests a greater than
50% likelihood of pretrial recidivism. As noted above, the statistics in
the Act's legislative history suggest a 7 to 20% overall pretrial recidivism
rate.2" Specific recidivism rates of drug dealers and firearm offenders
were unavailable among the statistics considered by Congress when the
Act was passed. However, the Supreme Court instructs courts to give
significant weight to "the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of ac-
tual experience and cull conclusions from it."20 5 Accordingly, the court
in Moore deferred to the Committee's finding that persons charged with
drug trafficking "pose a significant risk of pretrial recidivism, '206 and
held the Act's presumption constitutional on its face.20 7
Perhaps Congress' finding of a "significant" pretrial recidivism rate
deserves some deference. However, even increasing the 7 to 20% rate to
account for undetected crime, it cannot be said with at least substantial
assurance that the pretrial recidivism rate for drug traffickers and firearm
offenders exceeds 50%. In the absence of more compelling and crime
specific statistics, the Act's rebuttable presumption cannot be regarded as
rational and should be struck down as invalid. The courts should, in the
alternative, treat the rebuttable presumption as a permissive inference.
201. Id. at 158.
202. A minimal burden to rebut the presumption does not excuse the court's -duty to ana-
lyze the mandatory presumption as prescribed by the Supreme Court. In United States v.
Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 495 (N.D. Cal. 1985), the court noted that the defendant's burden to
produce evidence to rebut a mandatory presumption may be extremely low. While this mini-
mal burden would justify analyzing the presumption as permissive, the court observed that the
statutory scheme imposed a mandatory presumption and proceeded to analyze it as such.
203. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (emphasis added) (striking down a pre-
sumption allowing a jury to infer from possession of marijuana that defendant knew the mari-
juana was imported illegally).
204. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
205. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965).
206. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 20.
207. Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 496.
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2. Constitutionality of the Presumption as Construed
Most courts have held that the presumption of dangerousness im-
poses on the accused the burden of presenting some evidence to rebut
that presumption, while the government bears the ultimate burden of
20persuasion. 08 Most courts apply these burdens according to the follow-
ing scheme:
The government makes a showing of probable cause that the
accused committed a drug or firearm offense. This showing trig-
gers the presumption that no conditions can reasonably assure the
safety of the community. If the accused produces some evidence
that she will not commit any crimes pending trial, the burden shifts
to the government to show that she is a danger to the community.
Although rebutted, the presumption does not disappear. Rather, it
remains as one of the many factors to be considered by the judicial
officer.2 09
If the accused produces no evidence to rebut the presumption, the
judicial officer must order the accused detained.21 0 The difficult question
is how the burden of proof relates to the clear and convincing evidence
standard required by the Act. The courts have responded in three ways.
Most courts faced with this question have held that an unrebutted
presumption alone is enough to detain an individual.2 1 1 Thus, unless the
defendant produces some evidence that she is not dangerous, the govern-
ment need produce only evidence of probable cause to meet its burden of
persuasion. Since probable cause is a lesser standard than clear and con-
vincing evidence, this construction seems to conflict with the statutory
requirement that the judicial officer base her finding of dangerousness on
clear and convincing evidence. At least one court has responded to this
dilemma by treating the defendant's production of some rebuttal evi-
dence as a condition precedent to the statute's requirement of the clear
and convincing evidence standard.2 12 In other words, the clear and con-
vincing standard does not apply unless the defendant rebuts the
presumption.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 114-15 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 218 (1986); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 381-84 (1st
Cir. 1985) (addressing the presumption as it deals with risk of flight); United States v. Freitas,
602 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1985). But see United States v. Aiello, 598 F. Supp. 740,
743-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rebuttable presumption shifts burden of persuasion).
209. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding applies to flight
risk which is the same presumption as dangerousness); Fortna, 769 F.2d at 251 (holding ap-
plies to flight risk); Jessup, 757 F.2d at 382-84 (holding applies to flight risk).
210. See cases cited supra note 195.
211. See cases cited supra note 195.
212. Perry, 788 F.2d at 115: "The clear and convincing standard does not even operate
until the defendant has come forward with some evidence of lack of dangerousness."
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The Moore court took an intermediate position, rejecting the magis-
trate's conclusion that the clear and convincing evidence requirement
does not apply until the presumption is rebutted.2" 3 The court noted that
neither the Act nor the legislative history suggested affording different
levels of due process protection to the presumption and non-presumption
situations.21 4 Moore concluded that the presumption, even if unrebutted,
may never be the sole basis for detaining a defendant pending trial.2" 5
Even if the government had compelling evidence that the defendant com-
mitted the crime, the court reasoned, the government still had to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the additional claim that the defendant
was dangerous.216 However, because the government had in fact pro-
duced such additional proof, Moore had no occasion to address whether
the presumption remains effective when neither the defendant nor the
government produces additional information.2 17
The most limiting construction of the presumption was expressed in
United States v. Cox. 218 Cox criticized the predominant interpretation 21 9
of the presumption as raising serious constitutional ramifications:
Such an interpretation is erroneous and contrary to the funda-
mental principles of criminal jurisprudence. While the Act's provi-
sions allowing for pretrial detention are constitutional, that
constitutionality is impinged when the government seeks to justify
detention solely by virtue of the presumption. The government has
a statutory burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that
detention is warranted. The presumption can be a part of its arse-
nal in seeking to meet that standard, but the presumption, even
unrebutted, is insufficient standing alone to meet the burden of
clear and convincing evidence.220
The view articulated in Cox reconciles the burden of persuasion
placed on the government with the Act's requirement of a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard. If Congress intended the government to bear
such a heavy burden,22' as the majority of cases hold, then the govern-
ment is obligated to do more than merely establish probable cause. That
Congress intended the government to prove more than probable cause is
evident from the legislative history:
213. United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
214. Id. at 497-98.
215. Id. at 498.
216. Id. at 497.
217. Id. at 499 n.13.
218. 635 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Kan. 1986).
219. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
220. Cox, 635 F. Supp. at 1051-52 (emphasis in original).
221. "[T]he clear and convincing evidence requirement rightly places a heavy burden upon
the Government before this radical interference with freedom is imposed." United States v.
Fisher, 618 F. Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 231 (1986)).
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Because the requirements of [section 3142(e)] must be met
before a defendant may be detained, the fact that the defendant is
charged with an offense ... is not, in itself, sufficient to support a
detention order. However, the seriousness of the offenses... cou-
pled with the government motion is a sufficient basis for requiring
an inquiry into whether detention may be necessary to protect the
community from the danger that may be posed by a defendant
charged with one of these crimes.22 2
Professor Tribe has expressed grave reservations as to courts' abili-
ties to prevent use of this kind of statute as a wide scale detention
weapon.223 Courts recently have expressed similar concerns about the
automatic detention effect of the presumption.224 These concerns are not
without merit. A commentator recently observed that there are no re-
ported cases in which an alleged dealer of illegal drugs had been re-
leased.225 That commentator concluded that "the statutory presumption
against persons charged with drug related offenses has the actual effect of
denying bail to an entire class of persons, regardless of which burden the
courts hold that it shifts. '226
The court in Cox offered an alternative construction of the presump-
tion, which enables courts to identify and detain only the narrow group
of individuals227 to whom Congress directed the presumption without
jeopardizing automatically an entire class of defendants. The scheme is
structured as follows:
The accused should be allowed an opportunity to rebut the
presumption. If he is successful, the government must then estab-
lish dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, although the
Court can consider that Congress intended this type of offense to
merit special consideration. If the presumption is not rebutted ad-
equately or at all, then the prosecutor may use it as a factor in
establishing by some clear and convincing evidence that the ac-
cused is a threat to the safety of the community and should be
222. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 21 (emphasis added). The government must have
probable cause to charge a person with a crime. Congress did not intend for United States
Attorneys to detain a person by once again establishing probable cause. Detention requires
more than evidence of a crime. Detention on the basis of dangerousness requires proof of
dangerousness. The probable cause finding is enough, however, to conduct a detention
hearing.
223. See supra note 101.
224. "Initially, this Court is constrained to observe that it is opposed to any construction of
[18 U.S.C. § 3142] which results in automatic detention of Defendants charged with drug
related crimes. Such an 'ipso facto' interpretation would result in large scale detention and
raise obvious constitutional ramifications." United States v. Knight, 636 F. Supp. 1462, 1467
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 335 (4th
Cir. 1985).
225. Berg, supra note 194, at 736. Since then, this author knows of one decision which
released defendants charged with drug offenses. Knight, 636 F. Supp. at 1468-69.
226. Berg, supra note 194, at 737.
227. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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detained. But the presumption by itself would be inadequate to
prove dangerousness, so the prosecution must introduce other evi-
dence in addition.228
The court in United States v. Jones22 9 relied on this scheme to deny
the government's motion to detain the defendant on the basis of danger-
ousness. Defendant Jones was indicted on several drug counts. Jones
failed to rebut the presumption and the government produced evidence
of his "'lavish' lifestyle notwithstanding his lack of income from lawful
sources."' 230 The court concluded that although the defendant failed to
rebut the presumption, "the Government has not met its burden of pro-
ducing clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination
of conditions will assure his appearance or safety of the community." '231
The court emphasized that the clear and convincing evidence standard
was a heavy burden which must be met.232
The Act provides no guidance as to the effect of the presumption.
When a statute is ambiguous, the rules of statutory construction require
that the provisions be construed in favor of the defendant.233 The
scheme articulated in Cox construes the presumption in favor of the de-
fendant. In addition, it effectuates the legislative intent by both respect-
ing the Act's explicit requirement of a clear and convincing standard and
assisting the government with its burden in the case of alleged drug and
firearm offenders. Not only is the Cox construction fair, but, in light of
the presumption's questionable constitutionality, the Cox construction
may be the only alternative to finding the presumption wholly invalid.
3. Rebutting the Presumption
The previous section examined the effect of the presumption when
the defendant produced no rebuttal evidence. This section addresses the
situation in which a defendant attempts to rebut the presumption. Spe-
cifically, this section focuses on (1) the methods available to the defend-
ant to produce some evidence, and (2) the types of evidence required to
rebut the presumption sufficiently.
a. Methods of Producing Evidence
There are four possible methods available to the defendant for pro-
ducing evidence that she is not a danger to the community. First, she
can present her own witnesses to testify concerning her character, health,
employment status, family and community ties. In many cases, however,
228. United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (D. Kan. 1986) (citation omitted).
229. 614 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
230. Id. at 98.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487 (1966); United States v. Patterson, 664 F.2d
1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the nature of this evidence renders it insufficient to overcome the Act's
presumption.234 Secondly, she can cross-examine adverse witnesses who
appear at the hearing. However, as indicated above, this option is often
precluded by the government's use of proffered evidence rather than live
testimony. Third, the defendant may consider testifying herself. She is
then confronted with an "impermissible compelled election."'2 35 She may
be forced to waive her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion or suffer "the grave... disability of preventive detention. '236 One
magistrate, in a law review article, referred to this as a "Hobson's
choice" and concluded that as "the defendant is at a distinct disadvan-
tage," he will be "reluctant to testify in any way that could be used
against him at trial. '237
The court in Perry found that such an election "poses a serious risk
of unconstitutionality. ' 238 However, rather than finding the presump-
tion unconstitutional, Perry held that "[t]he availability of a judicial
grant of use-fruits immunity with respect to a defendant's testimony in
rebutting the presumption is both appropriate, and in this case necessary
to avoid holding that section 3142(e) violates the fifth amendment. 239
Courts that exercise their discretion in favor of use immunity cer-
tainly provide defendants with an additional procedural safeguard.
However, there is no guarantee that courts will grant defendants use im-
munity in every appropriate situation.
The fourth option available to defendants under the Act is to pres-
ent information by proffer.2" A defendant who has pleaded or will plead
not guilty, could proffer through her attorney a denial of each and every
allegation stated in the information or indictment. The judicial officer
then must make a credibility determination between the government's
and the defense's proffered evidence. As an evidentiary matter, "[w]hen
the [fact-finder] agrees that the probabilities of the existence or nonexis-
tence of an element are equal, the allocation of the burden of persuasion
becomes decisive in determining who prevails."24 Since the prosecution
bears the burden of persuasion in a detention hearing, the judicial officer
must rule in favor of the defendant.
This option is also problematic. The defense attorney may confront
ethical problems in proffering a denial for her client, particularly if she
knows at least some of the allegations to be true. Moreover, if the prose-
cution produces evidence in addition to the proffered testimony, the judi-
234. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 115 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986).
235. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, at 537-38.
236. Perry, 788 F.2d at 115.
237. Powers, supra note 153, at 416.
238. Perry, 788 F.2d at 115.
239. Id. at 116.
240. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(a) (1985).
241. G. LILLY, supra note 199, at 47 (emphasis in original).
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cial officer can rest her decision on that information. However, at the
very least, this method may force the government to produce more than
merely proffered testimony, hence increasing the reliability of the
factfinding process.
b. Sufficient Rebuttal Evidence
More than three years after the Act was passed, courts remain con-
fused as to the quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption
of dangerousness.2 4 The defendant's burden of production has been
characterized as "not a heavy one to meet"243 and "satisfied by 'any evi-
dence.' "2 The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Dominguez245 held it
was not necessary that a defendant prove he was not guilty of the crime
charged,246 or that he demonstrate such a crime is not dangerous to the
community.247 Rather, the court suggested that a defendant "show that
the specific nature of the crimes charged, or that something about their
individual circumstances, suggests that 'what is true in general is not true
in the particular case.' ,248 At least one other court recently has held
that the statute authorizes preventive detention only upon proof that the
defendant is likely to commit one of the enumerated offenses in the
Act.249 These cases suggest that a defendant need only present evidence
that she will not commit a serious crime.
These various characterizations appear to suggest that it is relatively
easy for a defendant to rebut the presumption of dangerousness. How-
ever, a recent case illustrates how deceptive these characterizations may
be. The defendant in United States v. Suppa2" ° was charged with con-
spiracy to distribute and distribution of cocaine. The indictment estab-
lishing probable cause triggered the presumption of dangerousness. The
government's evidence against Suppa consisted of the indictment,
Suppa's prior criminal record, information that at the time of the offense,
Suppa was on bail for another offense, and a proffer that an eyewitness
would testify against Suppa. The government produced no live
witnesses.25'
Suppa produced extensive rebuttal evidence. He proffered that he
did not commit the crime charged; that the government's eyewitness was
242. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986).
243. Id.
244. United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 495 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v.
Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380-82 (lst Cir. 1985) (defendant must produce some evidence).
245. 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986).
246. Id. at 706.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 707 (quoting Jessup, 757 F.2d at 384).
249. United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986).
250. 799 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986).
251. Id. at 116.
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unreliable; that he was complying with his conditions of release; that
other than the charges pending against him in another district, he had
last been charged thirteen years ago; that he had never attempted to flee
nor violate parole; and that he had lived at the same address for six years
with his wife of twenty-seven years and their six children.25 During the
hearing, Suppa was denied the right to examine an FBI agent as to the
government's case, although the agent was present at the hearing.2 53
In addition, Suppa produced on appeal: an affidavit from a bonding
company official swearing to Suppa's cooperation; affidavits from seven
people who swore he was not dangerous and were willing to post their
homes as security to obtain Suppa's bond; and an affidavit of the govern-
ment eyewitness' former cellmate, averring the witness had a history of
psychological problems, drug and alcohol abuse, and murder.25 4
The government conceded to the district court on appeal that the
"direct evidence" proffered to the magistrate regarding the eyewitness'
testimony consisted instead of "co-conspirators' statements" to the gov-
ernment's informant. 5 Nevertheless, the district court held that the de-
fendant failed to rebut the presumption of dangerousness and ordered
him detained. The Third Circuit affirmed.256
The court's holding in Suppa brings new meaning to the term "light
burden." It is difficult to characterize the defendant in that case as hav-
ing only a burden of producing some credible evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption. Even after the defendant discredited the government's
eyewitness, the court still expected the defendant to persuade the court
that he was not a danger to the community. The facts of Suppa strongly
suggest that the judicial officer had decided to detain the defendant at the
start of the hearing and received the rebuttal evidence as a mere
formality.
United States v. Knight257 provides a sharp contrast to Suppa. Four
defendants in Knight were charged with a variety of serious drug of-
fenses. The head of the drug organization, Joseph, was detained on a
finding of dangerousness. Joseph was charged with several drug offenses
and the government's evidence against him ran "the gauntlet of eviden-
tiary types. ' 258 The second defendant, Knight, was considered the gen-
eral manager of the organization. 259 He also was detained as dangerous
after the government produced extensive evidence. The court was most
disturbed by the fact that Knight had continued to operate the narcotics
252. Id. at 116-17.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 119.
255. Id. at 118.
256. Id. at 120.
257. 636 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
258. Id. at 1464.
259. Id. at 1465.
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organization even after Joseph had been arrested. This evidence con-
vinced the court that Knight was likely to continue his criminal activity
unless detained.26
The court did not detain the last two defendants, however, after
finding the government had failed to meet its burden. Although defend-
ant Hawkins had an extensive criminal record, he also had strong com-
munity ties. 6 ' The last defendant was released because he had strong
community ties, no criminal record, and the court considered him "a
small dealer who probably has a substance abuse problem.
2 62
Knight is the first reported case to release defendants charged with
drug offenses. Because the court objected to any construction of the Act
that would result in automatic detention,2 63 it conducted a specific in-
quiry as to the facts and circumstances of each defendant. The court
provided the defendants with a genuine opportunity to show that what is
generally true regarding narcotics offenders is not necessarily true in a
particular case.
Congress made a policy decision in narrowly directing the presump-
tion against drug and firearm offenders who were thought to pose a sig-
nificant risk of pretrial recidivism.261 The statistics indicate a recidivism
rate much lower than 100%.265 The Knight court carefully analyzed the
evidence and circumstances surrounding each defendant. By doing so, it
was able to balance the competing interests of community safety and pre-
trial liberty, attempting to identify only those defendants Congress in-
tended the courts to detain. Courts have interpreted the burden on the
government to be a substantial one, even when the presumption arises.266
The Supreme Court has characterized as appropriate detainees those
who present a "demonstrable danger to the community"2 67 and "an iden-
tifiable and articulable threat."26 Courts must impose this heavy burden
on the government lest they extend the net of the Bail Reform Act be-
yond its congressionally authorized and constitutionally permissible
limits.
260. Id. at 1467.
261. Whether Hawkins falls within the category of that identifiable group of Defend-
ants who pose a danger to the community presents a 'close question.' However,
exercising the flexibility this Court is afforded, and, in keeping with the intent of
3142(b) that the least restrictive condition should be imposed, this Court concludes
that the Government has failed to meet its burden as to this Defendant under the
appropriate criteria.
Id. at 1468.
262. Id. at 1469.
263. Id. at 1467.
264. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 6, at 6-7.
265. S. REP. No. 147, supra note 38, at 30.
266. United States v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047, 1051 (D. Kan. 1986); United States v.
Fisher, 618 F. Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 231 (1986).
267. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987).
268. Id.
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Conclusion
Americans in the 1980s fear a perceived increase in crime.
Although it is by no means clear that this perception is accurate, lobby-
ists have pressed for expanded law enforcement. The public's increased
fear of crime is attributable in part to a perception of judicial leniency
toward criminal recidivists. In an effort to reduce pretrial recidivism,
Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1984, authorizing courts to
detain arrested persons found to pose a significant danger to the commu-
nity. Prosecutors, responding to this rising public sentiment, continue to
widen the net cast by the Act. The United States Supreme Court legiti-
mized these enlarged perceptions of danger by holding that our Constitu-
tion permits the government to imprison unconvicted suspects on the
basis of predictions of future criminal behavior.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act
on its face, federal courts continue to struggle with its procedural aspects.
The Act provides a defendant with detention hearing rights to have
assistance of counsel, to testify, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at
the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise. These
rights, if effectuated, would enable a defendant to respond to ungrounded
allegations of dangerousness. However, courts have relied on Gerstein's
probable cause determination as the only constitutional due process re-
quirement, allowing these statutorily guaranteed rights to become, in ef-
fect, mere gratuities. Prosecutors are frequently permitted to establish
their case for detaining suspects without any real or substantial proof
beyond the probable cause that sustained the initial charge. As a result
of this recidivism hysteria and loose interpretation of the Act, accused
but presumptively innocent individuals find it more difficult to gain their
freedom than convicted parolees and probationers.
The Act combines informality with procedural safeguards designed
to identify a narrow group of dangerous defendants. When informality is
used to undermine strict judicial attention to the procedures that protect
their liberty interest, defendants must continue to challenge detentions
based on mere probable cause. The American Bar Association, while
supporting the use of the Act's preventive detention provisions, has ex-
pressed its view that they "be used sparingly and under tightly controlled
criteria. '2 69 Detached judicial officers serve a crucial role in our criminal
justice system as neutral buffers between the government prosecutor and
the citizenry. These judicial officers have a responsibility to adhere to the
Act by imposing preventive detention only on those defendants who pose
a serious and actual threat of danger to the community. Careful judicial
adherence to the Act will not only protect the important liberty interests
of criminal defendants; it will also strengthen the integrity of the judicial
269. Moss, Preventive Detention, 73 A.B.A. J. 34 (Feb. 1, 1987).
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system by implementing the fundamental constitutional privilege that no
person shall be deprived of her liberty without due process.
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